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Abstract
Within the last several years, new data have become available to test the various theoret-
ical models of EU decision-making, and, in doing so, to assess actor influence. This paper
examines the extent to which the recent DEU and DEUII datasets provide sufficient infor-
mation to distinguish between competing theoretical models of legislative decision-making,
and accurately assess the power of the different branches of EU government. It argues that
insufficient attention has been paid to measurement error in these data. Once measurement
error is accounted for, it becomes clear that these data do not provide sufficient information
to distinguish between most models of legislative politics. Moreover, empirical models that
fail to account for measurement error are likely to lead researchers to erroneous conclusions
about actors’ legislative influence.
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Introduction
Studies of separation-of-powers systems often wish to assess the relative power of the branches
of government in the legislative process. In a bicameral system, is one chamber more influ-
ential in drafting and passing legislation than the other? What is the role of the executive
branch? What are the sources of legislative influence — formal rules, preferences, or other
institutional resources, such as budgets for staff and research? To answer these basic ques-
tions, we first must determine who “won” during the legislative process. Which actor in the
political system is best able to change the outcome of negotiations in her favor? To assess
actors’ relative success, scholars must measure both the outcome of the legislative process,
as well as the preferences of actors involved. Doing so is not straightforward. This article ex-
plores a newly available and innovative dataset containing preferences and outcomes on 125
European Union (EU) legislative proposals — the Decision-making in the European Union II
(DEUII) data (Thomson, Arregui, Leuffen, Costello, Cross, Hertz and Jensen, 2012). It ex-
amines the extent to which researchers can use these data to test theoretical decision-making
models in the EU, and it assesses the power of the European Parliament (EP), Commission,
and Council of Ministers in the EU legislative process.
The paper first discusses the problems associated with assessing the legislative influence
of various branches of government in separation-of-powers systems, focusing in particular
on the issue of measuring policy preferences and outcomes. It then discusses these issues
specifically with respect to the EU and the DEU data.1 Using Monte Carlo simulations,
we demonstrate that a simple regression model accurately captures the relative influence of
all actors, but, due to measurement error in the DEU data, the influence of the European
Parliament and Commission is likely severely underestimated. After correcting for measure-
ment error, the EP likely has significant influence over legislation, and its influence is greater
under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) than under consultation. In addition,
measurement error may lead researchers to false conclusions when using the DEU data to test
competing theoretical models of legislative decision-making. The results build on recent lit-
erature that use Monte Carlo simulations to explore how the DEU data can best be employed
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to test spatial theories of legislative decision-making (Junge and Ko¨nig, 2007), as well as the
literature that uses the DEU data to evaluate bargaining models and the relative influence
of actors (Thomson, Stokman, Achen and Ko¨nig, 2006; Junge, 2010; Thomson, 2011; Ak-
soy, 2012; Golub, 2012). The findings have significant implications for how researchers test
spatial models of legislative politics, and how they ought to collect preference data in the
future.
Measuring preferences and outcomes in the legislative process
Researchers wishing to assess the relative influence of various actors in the legislative process
face a series of measurement and modeling problems. First, they must measure the policy
preferences of the relevant actors in a common space, along with the position of the negotiated
outcome, and the position of a reference point, reversion point, or status quo policy. Both
the space and the positions are latent, meaning the researcher cannot directly observe the
nature of the dimensions or the location of actors and outcomes on them. Instead, latent
dimensions, as well as actor and bill positions, must be estimated using a measurement model
(Jackman, 2008; Benoit and Laver, 2012).
Once estimates of latent positions are obtained, researchers often wish to use these data
to determine the extent to which actors are powerful, i.e. influential in the policymaking
process, simply lucky, perhaps due to their proximity to a truly powerful actor, or neither
(Barry, 1980). And, finally, upon determining which actors have influence, researchers are
often interested in what these results imply about the validity of theoretical models of leg-
islative bargaining. Different bargaining models imply different levels of bargaining power
for the relevant actors, and researchers wish to test these competing models against one
another (e.g. Thomson et al., 2006; Schneider, Finke and Bailer, 2010; Thomson, 2011).
In the US Congress literature, there has been significant attention devoted to the problem
of latent ideal point estimation within chambers, across chambers, across branches of govern-
ment, and over time (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004; Mc-
Carty and Shor, 2011). Scholars use ‘common space’ scores, which provide ideology es-
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timates for the US House, Senate, and President in the same space, to examine gridlock
(Binder, 1999), presidential veto power (Cameron, 2000, chap 6), and bureaucratic discre-
tion (Shipan, 2004), among other issues.
Studies of legislative bargaining in the EU have paid less attention to issues of ideal
point estimation in a common space. Given the lack of data, this oversight is not surprising.
While there have been numerous studies of ideology in the EP (e.g. Hix, 2002; Hix, Noury
and Roland, 2007; McElroy and Benoit, 2007; Proksch and Slapin, 2010; McElroy and Benoit,
2012), some work on policy preferences in the Council (e.g. Mattila and Lane, 2001), and a
few studies of attitudes in the Commission (e.g. Hooghe, 2005), researchers have made few
attempts to provide comparable estimates of ideology across branches. This is largely due to
the poor quality of data. Roll call data is best in the EP, but even here the extent to which
roll calls can be used to measure ideology is questionable (Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough,
Montgomery and Schambach, 2006; Proksch and Slapin, 2010). Providing comparable policy
positions across the branches of EU government is perhaps the primary contribution of the
DEU project (Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011; Thomson et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, problems exist with how the DEU project collected these preference data.
Unlike common space scores based on roll call votes in the US Congress, which are derived
directly from spatial voting theory and estimated using an item response model, the DEU
data are not derived from an underlying measurement model. Thus, they have no reported
uncertainty associated with them. Clearly, though, these positions are not measured per-
fectly — no estimates of ideology are. All estimates of policy positions are subject some
measurement error. When the positions of all actors are measured equally poorly or equally
well, the lack of measurement error is less of an issue, but as we will see below, this is unlikely
the case in the DEU. The position of the Council, as it is typically operationalized in DEU
studies of bargaining models, is more accurately measured than the position of the EP and
the Commission.
Measurement models assume that the concept being measured (in this case, ideology)
is latent — it cannot be directly observed. Instead, researchers only get to observe noisy
indicators of the latent variable (Carmines and Zeller, 1979, 10). Given that each indicator is
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noisy, and only captures the ‘truth’ on average, the best means to assess the latent concept is
to average over a number of indicators. Because the DEU data contain one position per issue
for each member state, plus a position for the EP and the Commission, the Council’s position
(generally taken as a weighted average of the member state positions) is better measured than
the EP and Commission positions, which are simply point estimates. This discrepancy in the
measurement quality of positions across branches creates problems both when attempting to
assess the relative influence of these branches and when testing competing theoretical models
of the bargaining process.
Model assessment and legislative influence
There exists no shortage of sophisticated theoretical models of EU decision-making (e.g.
Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Tsebelis, 1994; Crombez, 1996; Crombez, 1997;
Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). And these models often imply different power and influence for
the various branches of EU government. For example, Tsebelis (1994) has famously argued
that the EP had conditional agenda setting authority under the cooperation procedure, which
it gave up in return for veto power with the move to codecision (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000).
Others have taken issue with his model, arguing about the relative merits of agenda-setting
and veto powers (e.g. Moser, 1996; Crombez, 1997). Still others have suggested that EU
decision-making is best modeled using a cooperative game theory concept, such as the Nash
bargaining model or Shapley Shubik index (Achen, 2006; Schneider et al., 2010).
Testing these models has often led researchers to examine which branch of EU government
has the most influence over legislation. Some studies examine the EP’s legislative success
by examining the success of EP amendments (e.g. Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis and Kalandrakis,
1999; Tsebelis, Jensen, Kalandrakis and Kreppel, 2001; Kasack, 2004; Ha¨ge and Kaeding,
2007). These studies tend to find evidence supporting the conditional agenda-setting power
of the EP. But the authors are also very aware that their models assume that amendments
are not offered strategically, an assumption that seems unlikely to hold, and which runs
contrary to the assumptions of the rational decision-making models they seek to test. Others
4
have measured policy positions of all relevant actors on a few directives, and calculated the
various theoretical predictions based on the observed data (e.g. Ko¨nig and Po¨ter, 2001). The
Ko¨nig and Po¨ter study found that the EP is likely unable to use its veto power due to its
pro-integrationist positions.
Lastly, numerous authors have used the DEU data to test various models legislative
decision-making (Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011). The collaborators in the DEU
project have collected policy positions for member states, the Commission, the EP, and the
status quo (where one existed) on 125 controversial pieces of European legislation. The
positions where collected through numerous in depth, semi-structured interviews with key
informants, who were oftentimes participants in the legislative process from the Commission,
member state permanent representations, or the EP. The informants were asked to identify
individual issues within the legislation that were the most conflictual, define the endpoints
of the issue scales, and identify actors’ preferences, the status quo, and the outcome on a 0
to 100 scale representing the bargaining space.2
The DEU literature has tended to find that cooperative bargaining models, such as the
Nash bargaining solution, better predict outcomes than procedural models that account
for the rules of the decision-making process, such as Tsebelis’ conditional agenda-setting
model. While some using the DEU have found the EP is likely to have influence over
decision-making, especially under codecision (Selck and Steunenberg, 2004), recent work
by Thomson has suggested that both supranational actors — the EP and Commission —
have relatively little influence over decision-making compared with the power suggested by
theoretical decision-making models, such as the model proposed by Tsebelis and Garrett
(2000) (Thomson and Hosli, 2006; Thomson, 2011, chap 8). Theoretically, the codecision
(or ordinary) procedure ought to place to Council and Parliament on an equal footing, but
Thomson finds that the supranational actors have, at best, influence equal to 30% of the
Council’s. Indeed, many of Thomson’s models suggest significantly less power for both the
EP and Commission, on the order of 3% to 15% of the Council’s influence (Thomson, 2011,
207).
What accounts for the fact that, particularly in the DEU data, non-procedural weighted
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means models so vastly outperform procedural models that take account of the structure of
the legislative process? And why do the EP and Commission have relatively little influence
over legislative outcomes in the DEU data when the formal rules suggest they ought to have
more power? Using Monte Carlo simulations, as well as the DEU data itself, the remainder
of the paper demonstrates that problems arising from measurement error can lead to wrong
inferences about the accuracy of theoretical decision-making models and the influence of
the EP. Correcting for measurement error, we find that we can no longer conclude that
non-procedural models outperform procedural models in explaining legislative outcomes.
Moreover, we find that the EP likely possesses more legislative influence than the previous
results based on the DEU data suggest.
Monte Carlo simulations
Theory testing
We begin by conducting Monte Carlo simulations to assess the ability of data, such as
those collected by the DEU project, to distinguish between competing theoretical models
of legislative decision-making. We examine whether such data provide a researcher with
sufficient statistical power to distinguish between a Romer-Rosenthal (R-R) agenda setter
model (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978), chosen because it represents the simplest version of
an institutional game, and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), a cooperative game theory
bargaining concept (Nash, 1950). Not only do these models generate simple institutional and
non-institutional predictions, in a world with no measurement error they tend to make very
different predictions. Thus, they should be relatively easy to distinguish from one another.
If the data cannot distinguish between these models, they will not be able to distinguish
between more nuanced models that make more similar predictions.
We set up a game in which two players, i ∈ {A,B}, bargain over 150 independent
issues, j ∈ {1, 150}. On each issue, j, the players’ have single-peaked, Euclidean preferences,
xij, in a uni-dimensional space, Sj, consisting of 101 ‘locations’ ranging from 0 to 100,
Sj = {0, 1, 2, 3, · · · , 100}.3 Given that we are discussing European integration, we refer to
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these dimensions as representing players’ integration preferences across the j issues, where
the status quo level of integration, xSQ, is 0, and 100 represents maximal change towards
greater integration on the issue. But these labels are arbitrary and the dimensions could
represent any conflictual issue. Players’ ideal points on each issue are drawn from random
uniform distributions so that player A is, on average, more Euroskeptic (has a preference
closer to 0) than B. A’s ideal points, xAj, are drawn from SAj = {0, 1, 2, 3, · · · , 60}, while
B’s ideal points, xBj, are drawn from SBj = {40, 41, 42, 43, · · · , 100}. We can think of A as
representing the position of the Council, and B representing a supranational actor, either
the Commission or EP. The data are generated in a manner as similar as possible to the
DEU datasets.4
We will assume that R-R model represents the true data-generating process. Thus, the
Monte Carlo exercise explores the circumstances under which we can correctly identify the R-
R model as data generating process when tested against the NBS. We assume that player B is
the agenda-setter and makes a closed-rule proposal to A, which she can either accept or reject.
The equilibrium solution on an issue by issue basis is x∗j = 2 ∗ |xAj − xSQj| + xSQj if xBj >
2 ∗ |xAj − xSQj| + xSQj, and x∗j = xBj otherwise. In other words, on issues where B prefers
significantly more integration than A, B must offer to A the point that makes A indifferent
to the status quo. Otherwise, B can realize her ideal point.5 However, as researchers we
do not observe true positions, only noisy estimates of the truth. The observed preferences
are equal the true positions plus random noise: xobsAj = xAj + Aj, xobsBj = xBj + Bj,
x∗obsj = x
∗
j + x∗j , and x
∗
SQj = x
∗
j + x∗j , where ij ∼ N(0, σ).6 These observations are the data
we, as researchers, get to observe. We can think of them as being the data produced by the
DEU projects. As σ grows large, our measurements (observations) of the true positions and
outcomes become worse, although they are still correct on average.
To test whether we are able to distinguish between the R-R model and the NBS with
our observed data, we first must calculate the predictions of these two models for each issue
on the basis of our observed preferences. We then examine how well these models explain
the observed outcome. Thus, for each issue, we calculate the R-R prediction using the
observed values rather than the true values: RRPREDj = 2 ∗ |xobs.Aj − xobs.SQj| + xobs.SQj if
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xobs.Bj > 2 ∗ |xobs.Aj − xobs.SQj|+ xobs.SQj, and RRPREDj = xobs.Bj otherwise. The prediction
for the NBS is calculated as:
NBSPREDj = max
x∗j∈S
[UA(x
∗
j)− UA(xobs.SQj)] ∗ [UB(x∗j)− UB(xobs.SQj)].
In short, the NBS predicts that actors select the outcome in the bargaining space that
maximizes the product of the differences of their individual utilities for the outcome and the
status quo on each issue. We assume quadratic loss utility functions when calculating the
NBS.
Having calculated the predictions of our two models for all j issues, we regress the ob-
served outcome in our data on the predictions of the R-R and NBS models, calculated on
the basis of our observed preferences and the observed status quo. We suppress the constant
because, given the way the data are constructed, these two variables completely explain
the variance in the dependent variable.7 In fact, the R-R variable alone should completely
explain the variance as it represents the true data generating mechanism.
In a world with no measurement error (i.e., a world in which the observed R-R vari-
able precisely equals the true R-R issue-by-issue prediction, and the observed NBS variable
precisely equals the true NBS issue-by-issue prediction) there should be a perfect 1:1 relation-
ship between R-R variable and the outcome, and no relationship between the NBS variable
and the outcome. As measurement error in one independent variable increases, though, the
estimation of all coefficients in the model becomes biased. The coefficient on the poorly
measured variable is biased towards zero, and the coefficient on the better measured variable
may be biased in any direction. Moreover, the coefficient estimates are inconsistent, meaning
that bias persists even as the sample size increases (Greene, 2000, 375–80). This is often
referred to as the ‘error-in-variables’ problem, and despite its quite substantial consequences
for estimation, it has received relatively little attention in the political science literature (but
see Blackwell, Honaker and King, 2012). While we add the same amount of measurement
error to all positions (both actors, the SQ, and the outcome), the measurement error does
not affect the calculation of the R-R and the NBS variables in the same way. Because the
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NBS is effectively a weighted average of the positions, some measurement error in the actors’
positions tends to cancel out. On average, the measured NBS variable is, therefore, closer to
the true NBS solution, than the measured R-R variable is to the true R-R solution. When
σ = 8, the mean error for the NBS variable is approximately 9, while the mean error for the
R-R variable is approximately 14. In other words, additional measurement error affects the
calculation of the R-R variable to a greater extent than the NBS variable, and thus the R-R
variable is more poorly measured. As measurement error increases, we would expect greater
attenuation bias in the coefficient on R-R variable.
To start, we run four 1000-run simulations, varying σ from 2 to 12 to simulate increasing
measurement error in the positions of the two actors. Thus the standard deviation of the
error represents between 2% and 12% of the range of the scale, a relatively modest amount
of error. The results are presented graphically using boxplots in Figure 1. Each simulation is
represented by two boxplots, one displaying the distribution of the 1000 coefficient estimates
for the R-R prediction variable, and the second displaying the distribution of coefficient
estimates for the NBS variable.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
When σ is small (2), we are able to differentiate between the models quite easily. The re-
gression model always correctly identifies the R-R variable as better explaining the outcome,
with a regression coefficient of approximately 0.75, and always larger than the coefficient on
the NBS variable. However, only slight increases in measurement error (σ = 4 and above)
lead to scenarios in which the two models are nearly impossible to distinguish, or the incor-
rect model (the NBS) better explains the outcome. When σ = 4, the model estimates the
R-R coefficient to be greater than the NBS coefficient in 77% of simulations, when σ = 8 the
R-R coefficient is greater in less than 2% of simulations. As expected, additional measure-
ment error leads the model to favor the better measured, but incorrect, NBS variable over
the worse measured, but correct, R-R variable.
While the DEU provides us with no way to assess measurement error, given that positions
are collected on a 0− 100 scale, a standard deviation of 8 for any given position seems like
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the least amount of measurement error that one might expect. It implies that the average
position estimate in the data is off by only 8 points on the 101 point scale. In short, even
relatively small amounts of measurement error make it difficult for researchers to distinguish
between institutional models and non-institutional models, such as R-R and NBS. Even if
the R-R model were the correct data generating process, when measurement error exists we
could very easily draw the erroneous conclusion that the NBS better explains the bargaining
process. Moreover, we have run simulations for the simplest of possible worlds — two actors
playing the simplest of non-cooperative institutional games and employing the NBS. If we
wished to use such data to distinguish between more nuanced theories that make more similar
predictions, we would need much better, and much more data.
Legislative influence
The above Monte Carlo simulations examined whether data resembling those collected in the
DEU project are able to distinguish between competing theoretical decision making models.
We found that they can only do so if we are willing to assume that positions of actors and
outcomes are measured very exactly. We now turn to our attention to tests of legislative
influence. Are we able to use the DEU data to assess the relative influence of different actors
over the legislative process? To answer this question, we must account for how the positions
of collective EU actors are measured in the DEU datasets. The DEU project has collected
data on the positions of all member state governments, as well as the position of the EP,
the Commission, and — where one could be identified — the legislative status quo. For
a small number of issues in the DEUII project, positions for EP groups were collected, as
well. However, the experts were not able to identify much variance in the group positions.
Thus, for the most part, the Commission and EP preferences are represented by a single
point estimate. In contrast, in most analyses, the estimate of the Council position takes into
account numerous point estimates — namely the point estimates of each individual member
state. It is often calculated as an average (often weighted, but sometimes not) of member
state positions (Selck and Rhinard, 2005; Thomson and Hosli, 2006; Thomson, 2011) or using
the Council median (Selck and Steunenberg, 2004). Using Monte Carlo simulations, we will
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show that, even when all positions (e.g. EP, Commission, member states, and outcomes) are
measured with the same degree of error, as a result of averaging numerous point estimates,
the aggregate Council position tends to be measured better than the positions of the EP and
Commission. Due to the effects of the ‘error-in-variables’ problem discussed above, models
of legislative influence, therefore, tend to overestimate the Council’s strength relative to the
supranational actors.
In these Monte Carlo simulations, we begin by constructing true positions for a Council
with seven members and a single position for the European Parliament for each of 150 issues.
Thus, the simulation is, once again, designed to closely mirror the DEU data. The true po-
sitions of the seven Council members are drawn from a random uniform distribution ranging
from 0 to 100. For each issue, we calculate the Council mean, which represents the Council’s
‘true’ bargaining position. The positions of the EP are drawn from a random uniform dis-
tribution ranging from 40 to 100. The EP, therefore tends to prefer more integration than
the average Council member. The true outcome of negotiations on each issue is assumed
to represent a negotiation between the EP and the Council in which each branch has equal
bargaining power, plus some random error:
Outcometrue = 0.5 ∗ EPtrue + 0.5 ∗ CouncilMeantrue + 
where  ∼ N(0, 5). We next calculate our observed positions for each of the seven member
states, the EP, and the outcome. They are equal to the true positions plus measurement
error drawn from a normal distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 8. Thus, each position is
measured with same degree of error. We obtain a single point estimate for the Council
by taking the mean of these seven observed member state positions. The measurement of
the Council position mirrors the operationalization found in Thomson and Hosli (2006) and
Thomson (2011), and captures the position taken by Achen (2006) that the mean of Council
members best captures the decision-making outcome.
Next, we regress the observed outcome on the average of the observed member state
positions, i.e. the Council position, and EP position, suppressing the constant just as we
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did above. We first regress the true outcome on the true mean Council position and the EP
position to ensure that our regression model accurately captures the truth, i.e. the power we
have, by construct, assigned to the Council and EP. We conduct 1000 runs of each simulation,
and we again present the results using a series of boxplots, found in Figure 2, to represent
the coefficients across all runs. The first two boxplots show that the regression model very
accurately recaptures the truth, as we would expect, correctly assigning each actor equal
power: β = 0.5. We next regress the observed outcome on the observed EP position and
the observed Council position, measured as the mean of observed member state positions.
Here, we see that the power of the EP is underestimated, while the power of the Council
is significantly overestimated. In 92% of the runs the Council is estimated to have greater
power than the EP even though we know their power is equal by design. These findings are
a result of measurement error. When σ = 8, the average observed EP position is 6.4 away
from the true EP position on our 0 to 100 scale, while the average Council mean is only 2.4
away from the true Council mean. 8
By averaging over the positions of the member states to obtain the observed Council
position, the measurement error in the observed Council position is decreased. In effect,
the measurement error in individual state positions cancels out. Because the EP is only a
point estimate, its measurement error remains. The measurement error in the EP variable
leads to an attenuation in the estimate of EP strength, and upward bias on the effects of
the better measured Council variable. As the number of positions averaged to obtain the
observed Council position increases, this problem is becomes worse.9
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
We next attempt to correct for the measurement error in the EP position using an
error correction model, namely the SIMEX model developed by Cook and Stefanski (1994).
SIMEX regression corrects for measurement error in an independent variable by adding
additional error to that variable and using simulations to extrapolate back to a scenario in
which no error is present. It requires that the researcher specify the level of measurement
error he believes is present in the poorly measure variable. In our simulation, we have set
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the level of error, so we can precisely specify it in the SIMEX model. We treat the EP
position as the poorly measured variable and we define its measurement error as the average
difference of the observed EP position from its true position — approximately 6.4 when
σ = 8. The boxplots demonstrate that SIMEX model returns close to the correct coefficients
on average, assigning almost equal power to the Council and EP. Moreover, the average
difference between the two coefficients across all 1000 simulations is only 0.08.
These Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that the existence of measurement error in
data such as the position estimates collected in the DEU projects can lead researchers to
incorrect conclusions about the validity of theoretical bargaining models and the power of
actors in the decision-making process. Once we account for measurement error, we find that
there is insufficient information in the DEU data to distinguish between even the simplest
of competing bargaining models. Moreover, because of the way in which researchers tend
to operationalize the Council position, the Council position is better measured than the EP,
which could lead researchers to falsely conclude that the Council is more powerful than the
EP. Both simulations demonstrate that whenever a researcher pits a variable operationalized
as an average against a variable operationalized as a point estimate, the average will prevail
even when the point estimate represents the correct model.
Data and results
Until now, all of the results presented have been based on ‘made-up’ data — data constructed
to simulate the data collection process of the DEU projects. Constructed data and Monte
Carlo simulations are very helpful to understand what researchers can learn from certain
types of data, but of course, at some point we wish to turn our attention to actual data.
In this section, we use the DEUII data to assess the relative strength of the EP and the
Council, using the knowledge gleaned from the Monte Carlo results presented above.
Using real data introduces additional issues. The DEU data contain missing observations,
and the data are hierarchical in nature — multiple issues are nested within each legislative
proposal. In addition, the data provide estimates of issue saliency, and many users of the data
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have argued that accounting for issue saliency is important when testing bargaining models;
actors likely bargain harder on issues most salient to them (e.g. Thomson, 2011; Golub, 2012).
We attempt to take all these issues into account. First, to account for missing positions and
saliency estimates, we use Amelia II to impute missing values (Honaker, King and Blackwell,
2011).10 Accounting for the multilevel structure of the data is more difficult. Ideally, we
would run a multilevel model. However, we already have a complicated error structure due to
the presence of measurement error. Thus, it is even more difficult to properly account for the
hierarchical nature of the data. There are no easy-to-implement error correction models that
account for hierarchical data. While failing to account for missing data and measurement
error can lead to biased coefficient estimates, failing to account for non-independence of
observations in cross-sectional data only biases standard errors. As our primary focus is on
correcting for potential bias in coefficients, we present SIMEX models rather than multilevel
models. The OLS models, however, were run with robust standard errors, which have little
impact on the magnitude of the standard errors. In addition, we ran random effects models
with varying intercepts for legislative proposal. The difference between the random effects
model and the simple OLS model is minimal, so we can be confident that ignoring the
multilevel structure in the SIMEX models does not greatly affect our results.
To account for issue saliency, we first rescale the position data so the positions range
from −10 and 10, and then weigh them so issues with low salience for an actor score near 0,
indicating indifference. Specifically, the rescaled positions are calculated as
(posorig−50)∗salience
500
.
Outcome and reference variables are also rescaled to range from −10 to 10 so they are on
the same scale as the weighted position estimates. The Council position is calculated as the
weighted average of member state preferences, where weighting is done by Council votes.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 presents five models. The first model regresses the outcome of negotiations on
the positions of the EP, the Commission, and the Council, suppressing the constant, thus
employing the same model used in the earlier Monte Carlo results. The second model reruns
this model using a SIMEX regression. The third model includes a dummy for the decision-
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making procedure (co-decision = 1) and interacts the dummy with position of the EP and the
Commission to determine if the supranational actors are more influential under co-decision.
The fourth and fifth models account for the position of the reference point by regressing the
degree of change on each issue on the distance of the actors (Council, EP, and Commission)
from the reference point. Model 4 presents an OLS regression and model 5 reruns model 4
as a SIMEX model.
The results of model 1 mirror the findings of others using the DEU data; the Council has
significantly more influence than the EP or the Commission. The coefficient on the Council
position is more than four times the magnitude of the EP and Commission coefficients. From
the Monte Carlo results, though, we know that the model significantly underestimates the
influence of the EP and Commission — the actors measured using a single point estimate
only, rather than a weighted average. The second regression model presents the results of a
SIMEX regression which corrects for measurement error in the Commission and EP variables.
The model uses σ = 6 as the standard deviation of measurement error, the approximate
standard deviation of both the EP and Commission positions in the data. The results
are robust to choosing different levels of measurement error. In this model, the coefficient
on the Council variable remains identical to the previous model, but the Commission and
EP coefficients both approximately double in magnitude. This model suggests that, taken
together, the positions of the supranational actors explain a similar amount of variance in
the outcome as the Council. The third model includes a control for issues decided under the
co-decision procedure and interacts the co-decision variable with the EP and Commission
preference variables. While theoretical models of EU legislative politics differ in how they
discuss the various procedures and the influence they provide to actors, everyone agrees that
the EP gained veto power under the co-decision procedure, and for the first time became a
legislative co-equal with the Council. This model does not correct for measurement error as
the error structure is more complex, involving both the position of the supranational actors
and the interaction term. We can be confident, though, that the model underestimates
the influence of the supranational actors. The aim of this model simply is to examine
how co-decision impacts the influence of the supranational actors. The results show that
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under co-decision, the EP has significantly more influence over legislative outcomes, and the
Commission’s influence remains virtually unchanged. Although the EP’s influence remains
one-third that of the Council’s in this model, the earlier results have demonstrated that
the model significantly understates its influence. Models 4 and 5 control for the position of
the reference point. Here, we regress the distance of the outcome from the reference point
on the distance of the actors’ preferences from the reference point. Again, we see that, in
model 4, which does not include any correction for measurement error, the Council distance
better explains outcome change. However, once we correct for measurement error in model
5, the coefficient on the Council distance decreases in magnitude, while the coefficient on EP
distance almost doubles.
Conclusion
The DEU projects have undoubtedly added to our understanding of the EU legislative pro-
cess, and they provide an invaluable source of information on actors’ positions and salience
on critical policy domains in the EU. However, researchers must carefully consider how best
to use these data, taking into account the amount of information they contain. The data
are unlikely to contain sufficient information to support many of claims in the literature
regarding the strength of bargaining models in capturing EU decision-making, and which
actors have greater bargaining power. Because of measurement error, theoretical models
that involve taking a weighted average will always outperform models that do not when pit-
ted against one another, regardless of which model actually represents the data generating
process. Thus, it is unsurprising that many tests of competing bargaining models using the
DEU data have found support for non-institutional models over institutional models, and
that the Council is more influential. Given the simulations presented here, though, we would
not want to conclude that the institutional models are wrong or that EP is powerless.
This is not to say that the DEU data are always ill-suited for testing bargaining models.
Aksoy (2012) and Junge (2010) provide two recent examples of studies that use the DEU
data to test the empirical implications of bargaining models without pitting a weighted
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average variable against a point estimate. They both find support for institutional models
of decision-making. Moreover, the data have been used in many other useful ways beyond
tests of bargaining models. Thomson and Torenvlied (2010), for example, use the data as a
measure of preferences to examine different perspectives on delegation to the Commission.
Future efforts to collect preference data in the EU must carefully consider measurement
error and measurement models during the data collection process. Recent studies in the
American literature that link responses from civil servants’ internet survey responses to
Congressional roll call votes provide a potentially fruitful guide to EU scholars (Clinton,
Bertelli, Grose, Lewis and Nixon, 2012). These authors use a measurement model to generate
truly comparable position estimates for parts of US government where roll call voting never
occurs, namely executive branch agencies. Scholars of the EU face an identical problem
— a lack of suitable data for measuring ideology across the branches of EU government.
Until scholars are able to collect better measures, current analyses must carefully consider
measurement error when presenting and interpreting results using the data we have.
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Notes
1The DEUII data expand upon an earlier project — Decision-making in the European Union
(DEU) (Thomson et al., 2006). The data collection process in the two projects was nearly identical,
and the results presented in this paper apply to both datasets. Throughout the paper, the DEU
abbreviation refers to both datasets. The data are publicly available and were downloaded from
http://www.robertthomson.info/research/resolving-
controversy-in-the-eu.
2See Thomson (2011) for a complete description of the data collection process, as well as a
discussion of reliability and validity checks.
3On any single issue, players cannot occupy the same position. If random draws place both
actors on the same location, +1 is added to B’s location.
4In fact, the Monte Carlo set up likely provides somewhat ‘cleaner’ data than those produced
by the DEU project. In the DEU data, preferences tend to clump on certain points on the scale.
Many of the issues are actually dichotomous, with actors’ preferences (along with the outcome and
status quo) located at either 0 or 100. Assuming this clumping is an artifact of the data collection
process, it makes testing procedural models even more difficult.
5Of course, this very simple game assumes that log-rolling across issues is not possible.
6In the simulations, these observed positions are rescaled back onto the 0-100 space, as the
random draws may place some observed positions outside the 0–100 interval.
7Slapin (2008, 2011) employs a similar regression approach to testing competing models and
actors’ bargaining power when examining negotiations at EU intergovernmental conferences.
8Indeed, because we consider each actors’ position as a normally distributed independent random
variable, mathematically the Council’s position must be better measured than the EP’s. The
variance of the mean of n normally distributed independent random variables is equal to V ar( 1nX1+
1
nX2 + . . . +
1
nXn) =
(
1
n
)2
V ar(X1) +
(
1
n
)2
V ar(X2) + . . . +
(
1
n
)2
V ar(Xn). As n increases, the
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variance around the mean of these multiple distributions decreases. For example, imagine that
the EP’s position is normally distributed with a standard deviation equal to 8. Meanwhile, the
Council is composed of two member states also with normally distributed independent positions,
each with a standard deviation of 8 as well. If we measure the Council’s position as the mean of
the two states, its position will also be normally distributed, but its standard deviation will only be√(
1
2
)2 ∗ 82 + ( 1n)2 ∗ 82 = 5.66, significantly less than the standard deviation of the EP’s position,
even though the distributions of the EP and both member states had the same standard deviation.
9I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the EP bargaining position may
still be measured with greater accuracy than the Council bargaining position because experts were
asked specifically to assess the EP bargaining position, whereas they were only asked to assess
member state positions, and not a collective Council bargaining position. Instead, the Council
bargaining position is estimated as a weighted average of the member state positions, thus making
addition assumptions about Council bargaining works. Unfortunately, given the lack of uncertainty
estimates, as well as the lack of positions for actors within the EP, there is no way to assess this
statement. Moreover, given the number of member state positions being averaged to arrive at the
Council position, the EP’s position would need to be substantially better measured to overcome
the math described above.
10Due to extreme missingness, we do not impute values for Bulgaria, Romania, or the EP groups.
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Figure 1: Predictive Power of R-R Model and NBS with Varying Levels of Measurement Error.
RR NB RR NB RR NB RR NB
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
{Model 1 SD2 {Model 2 SD4 {Model 3 SD8 {Model 4 SD12
Note: The boxplots are created from coefficient estimates of 1000 regressions. In each regression,
the true bargaining outcome (constructed using the R-R model) is regressed on the prediction of
the R-R model and the NBS model under various levels of measurement error in position estimates.
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Figure 2: Power of EP and Council with Measurement Error.
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Note: The boxplots are created from coefficient estimates of 1000 regressions. In each regression, the
true bargaining outcome (constructed assuming equal power for the EP and Council) is regressed
on the observed positions of the EP and Council, where the EP is measured using a single point
estimate and the Council position is an average of member positions.
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Table 1: Explaining DEUII Outcomes with Actor Preferences
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OLS – MI SIMEX OLS – MI OLS – MI SIMEX
EP 0.19∗ 0.44∗ 0.07
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Commission 0.17∗ 0.34∗ 0.17∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Council 0.96∗ 0.99∗ 1.02∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Codecision*EP 0.25∗
(0.14)
Codecision*Commission 0.03
(0.10)
Codecision −0.99∗
(0.53)
Distance Council 0.75∗ 0.65∗
(0.09) (0.10)
Distance EP 0.15∗ 0.27∗
(0.06) (0.09)
Distance Commission 0.14∗ 0.11∗
(0.06) (0.05)
N 331 331 331 331 331
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05. The
dependent variable in models 1–3 is the outcome of negotiations. The dependent variable in models
4–5 is the absolute change in the outcome from the reference point.
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